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Vishay Intertechnology, Inc. v. Delta International Corp:
The Reach of North Carolina's Long-Arm Statute
The question whether an out-of-state corporation's contacts with a state
are sufficient to permit that state's courts to exercise jurisdiction consistent
with due process under the state long-arm statute requires a careful applica-
tion of complex factors. The interstate character of modern commercial trans-
actions and recent United States Supreme Court pronouncements on the reach
of long-arm jurisdiction' complicate the analysis. In Vishay Intertechnology,
Inc. v. Delta International Corp. 2 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit held that, in limited circumstances, telephone and written com-
munications between California and North Carolina were sufficient to satisfy
the requirements of both the North Carolina long-arm statute and federal due
process.
The Vishay court was faced with a defendant whose routine commercial
practices involved little contact with North Carolina. The government of Ko-
rea unwittingly laid the foundation for multiple litigation when it solicited
bids for sixty units of a measurement device. Vishay Intertechnology, Inc.
(Vishay), a Delaware corporation that manufactures and sells such measure-
ment devices through its North Carolina office, submitted the next-to-lowest
bid on the devices through its agent in Korea. The bid was based on its for-
eign list price.3 Delta International (Delta), a California corporation, submit-
ted the lowest bid on the devices. Delta's bid was based on an oral quotation
of Vishay's domestic price for the instruments that allegedly was obtained
deceptively.4
The alleged misrepresentation arose out of a complex series of events.
Delta's vice-president had telephoned Vishay requesting one measurement de-
vice. He allegedly misrepresented himself as an agent of "Delta Corporation"
and a Vishay order clerk mistakenly quoted the unit's domestic price. A
Vishay supervisor who was preparing the written quotation, however, recog-
nized Delta as an exporter. At his supervisor's request the order clerk notified
Delta that the foreign price would apply.5 Delta insisted that the domestic
price should apply, and Vishay withdrew the oral quotation. Delta next sent
Vishay a purchase order for sixty units of the device at the domestic price;
1. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (Oklahoma court's
exercise of jurisdiction offended minimum contacts requirement of International Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). See generally Louis, The Grasp of Long Arm Jurisdiction Finally
Exceeds Its Reach: .A Comment on World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson and Rush v.
Savchuk, 58 N.C.L. REv. 407 (1980).
2. 696 F.2d 1062 (4th Cir. 1982).
3. Vishay charges higher prices in foreign markets than in domestic markets because over-
seas marketing involves greater sales commission, promotion, service, warranty, and technical
assistance costs. .d. at 1064.
4. Although Vishay informed the Korean government that Delta's bid was obtained decep-
tively, Delta's bid was not disqualified because of the government's bidding policy. Id.
5. The order clerk contacted Delta's vice-president, who initially denied that Delta was an
exporter. Id.
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Vishay rejected the purchase order.6 In subsequent communications, Delta
demanded that Vishay supply the devices at the domestic price, and
threatened to sue if Vishay did not comply. Eventually, Delta did file suit
against Vishay in a California federal district court, but the complaint was
dismissed on the merits following a hearing. Delta eventually obtained similar
devices from a competitor of Vishay, and sold them to the Korean
government.7
Vishay then filed suit against Delta in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of North Carolina. Vishay sought damages for unfair and
deceptive business practices, tortious interference with contractual relations,
and abuse of process. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of
sufficient contacts between Delta and the State to satisfy the requirements of
personal jurisdiction under North Carolina's long-arm statutes. 8 The court of
appeals reversed.9 The court concluded that Delta's contacts with North Car-
olina-three letters and five telephone calls to Vishay's North Carolina of-
fice-satisfied the requirements of the North Carolina long-arm statutes and
federal due process.' 0
At the outset, the Vishay court noted that the North Carolina long-arm
statutes I should be construed liberally, permitting the assertion ofjurisdiction
to the full extent allowed by due process. 12 Foreign corporations not transact-
6. The purchase order allegedly represented the first time that Delta indicated a need for
more than one unit. Delta admitted that the 60 units were to be offered for resale to the Korean
government. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1065.
9. Id. at 1063. The court first set forth the process for determining jurisdiction under a
long-arm statute:
To resolve a question of personal jurisdiction, the court must engage in a two step
analysis. First, the court must determine if the applicable North Carolina law would
allow the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction over Delta. If so, the court must determine if
such an exercise of jurisdiction comports with due process.
Id. at 1064.
10. Id. at 1067-69.
11. North Carolina's comprehensive long-arm statute, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4 (1983), was
modeled after Wisconsin's long-arm statute. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 801.05 (West 1977 & Supp.
1983). North Carolina General Statutes § 1-75.4(2) provides for the exercise ofjurisdiction under
any state statute that specifically confers jurisdiction. Thus, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-143 to -145
(1982), enacted in 1955 and redesignated as part of the Noi'th Carolina Business Corporation Act,
remain in effect to provide alternative grounds for asserting jurisdiction over corporations. See 1
A. MCINTOSH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 937.5-937.20 (2d ed. Supp.
1970); R. ROBINSON, NORTH CAROLINA CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 32-1 to -9 (3d ed.
1983). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-145 (1982) grants jurisdiction over foreign corporations not transact-
ing business in the State; it is the "most far-reaching of the statutes asserting jurisdiction over
foreign corporations." I A. MCINTOSH, supra § 937.20, at 180 n.98.73. Section 55-145 had been
called "the minimum contact statute" prior to the adoption of § 1-75.4. See Note, Corporations-
Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations Not Qualfed to Transact Business Mi North Carolina, 44
N.C.L. REv. 449, 543 (1966). See generally Comment, Jurisdiction over Forein Corporations Not
Transacting Business in North Carolina-A Changing Attitude, 2 WAKE FOREST INTRA. L. REv. 1
(1966) (tracing development of North Carolina law under § 55-145).
12. "There is a clear mandate that the North Carolina long-arm statute be given a liberal
construction." Vishay, 696 F.2d at 1065. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.1 (1983) provides: "This Article
shall be liberally construed to the end that actions be speedily and finally determined on their
merits." Furthermore, the drafters of the Business Corporation Act provide insight into the legis-
lature's intent in adopting N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-145 (1982).
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ing business in the State also are subject to suit on any cause of action arising
out of "tortious conduct" within the State under North Carolina General Stat-
utes section 55-145(a)(4). 13 Because Delta's initial solicitation of a price quo-
tation and the resulting oral and written communications formed the facts
necessary to prove Vishay's claims of unfair business practices and interfer-
ence with contractual relations, the court of appeals concluded that these tele-
phonic and written communications constituted "tortious conduct" within
North Carolina. The court relied on Murphy v. Erwin-Wasey, Inc.,14 in which
the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit had recognized the
modem business practice of using mail service rather than personal messen-
gers, and stated that "[w]here a defendant knowingly sends into a state a false
statement, intending that it should be relied upon to the injury of a resident of
that state, he has, for jurisdictional purposes, acted within that state." 15 The
Forein corporations are by Section 145 made subject to local suits by residents of North
Carolina in some situations where they have engaged in specified activity giving rise to a
cause of action locally, even though they are not so "transacting business" as to be re-
quired to obtain a certificate of authority. International Shoe Co. i. State of Washington
is thought to have removed the constitutional barriers against such an extension of juris-
diction over a foreign corporation which is not so transacting business as to come within
the domestication requirements. Provision is also made for substantial service in this
situation. It is thought that wise policy favors subjecting such foreign corporations to
suit here for the convenience of residents of this state where it is constitutionally possible,
since the alternative is to force our residents to bring their actions in foreign jurisdictions.
Latty, Powers & Breckenridge, The ProposedNorth Carolina Business Corporation Act, 33 N.C.L.
Rav. 26, 54 (1954) (emphasis added). Thus, "[e]ach of these statutes was apparently intended to
extend the jurisdiction of the North Carolina courts over foreign corporations to what was on each
occasion believed to be the ultimate limits allowed by due process." R. RoBINSON, supra note 11,
§ 32-1, at 477.
13. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-145(a)(4) (1982):
(a) Every foreign corporation shall be subject to suit in this State, whether or not
such foreign corporation is transacting or has transacted business in this State and
whether or not it is engaged exclusively in interstate or foreign commerce, on any cause
of action arising as follows:
(4) Out of tortious conduct in this State, whether arising out of repeated activity or
single acts, and whether arising out of misfeasance or nonfeasance.
In Munchak Corp. v. Riko Enters., 368 F. Supp. 1366, 1379 (M.D.N.C. 1973) the court stated,
'[Wlhen seeking to acquire personal jurisdiction under G.S. § 55-145(a)(4) a plaintiff must show:
(1) that the cause of action arose in North Carolina; and (2) the defendant committed one or more
acts which gave rise to the cause of action in this State."
14. 460 F.2d 661 (Ist Cir. 1972). The long-arm statute applicable in Murphy allowed the
court to obtain personal jurisdiction in a cause of action arising out of the person's "causing tor-
tious injury by an act or omission in this commonwealth." MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 223A,
§ 3(c) (West Supp. 1984). In Murphy the court stated that the delivery in Massachusetts by mail or
telephone of a false statement originating outside the state, followed by reliance on the statement
in Massachusetts, was an act within Massachusetts. Murphy, 460 F.2d at 664. This statement was
not necessary to the court's holding, however, since false statements also were made face-to-face
within the state.
15. Murphy, 460 F.2d at 664. The Murphy court relied on Buckley v. New York Post Corp.,
373 F.2d 175, 179 (2d Cir. 1967), in which the court stated that "damage to a person's reputation
caused by sending a libel into the state where he lives could still be considered as arising from
'tortious conduct' in that state," because "it could well be said that that publisher directly inflicts
damage on the intangible reputation just as the frequently hypothesized but rarely encountered
gunman firing across a state line does on the body." After paraphrasing from the above-quoted
passage, the Murphy court concluded:
We believe the same is true of the mailing of a fraudulent misrepresentation into a
state. We would be closing our eyes to the realities of modern business practices were we
1122 [Vol. 62
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Vishay court rejected defendant's arguments that Murphy was questionable
authority, 16 and noted that the Murphy rationale has been followed more
often than rejected. 17
In determining whether causing process to be served on Vishay also con-
stituted "tortious conduct" within North Carolina for purposes of section 55-
145, the court looked to comparable cases in other federal courts.' 8 The court
to hold that a corporation subjects itself to the jurisdiction of another state by sending a
personal messenger into that state bearing a fraudulent misrepresentation but not when
it follows the more ordinary course of employing the United States Postal Service as its
messenger.
Murphy, 460 F.2d at 664.
16. Vishay, 696 F.2d at 1066. The only two cases relied on by Delta that rejected the Murphy
rationale were Margoles v. Johns, 483 F.2d 1212 (D.C. Cir. 1973) and Weller v. Cromwell Oil Co.,
504 F.2d 927 (6th Cir. 1974). Although both cases can be distinguished from Murphy, they both
rejected Murphy.
Margoles was distinguishable because it involved a different type of long-arm statute than
that at issue in Murphy. Nevertheless, the Margoles court criticized the apparent distinction
drawn in Murphy between intentional acts causing a "tortious injury" within the state and negli-
gent acts creating a condition from which damage might later arise. Referring to the Murphy
court's reasoning, the Margoles court remarked: "Evidently an intentional act. . . is a type of
continuing wrong which carries its perpetrator mysteriously along and thrusts him, constructively
of course, into the domain of the injurious consequences. The law regarding jurisdictional matters
is confusing enough; it needs less legal fictions, not more." Margoles, 483 F.2d at 1220.
Weller was distinguishable from Murphy on the basis that Weller subjected officers of a cor-
poration to jurisdiction. Disregarding this distinction, the Weller court observed that "Murphy
. . . was rejected by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Margoles v. Johns."
Weller, 504 F.2d at 930. The court concluded "the decision in Margoles is sound, and we will
follow it." Id. at 931.
In another case cited by Delta, Kolikofv. Samuelson, 488 F. Supp. 881 (D. Mass. 1980), the
court distinguished Murphy. Kolikof, 488 F. Supp. at 883. Kolikof also gave one of the best
explanations of the Murphy rationale: "In a misrepresentation case such as Murphy, the nature of
the information transmitted across state lines is a crucial element of the alleged tort since it is the
words themselves which are intended to bring about the injury." id.
17. Vishay, 696 F.2d at 1066-67 (citing Ammon v. Kaplow, 468 F. Supp. 1304 (D. Kan.
1979)). See also Brown v. Flowers Indus., 688 F.2d 328 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
1275 (1983); Thorington v. Cash, 494 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1974); J.E.M. Corp. v. McClellan, 462 F.
Supp. 1246 (D. Kan. 1978).
In addition to the cases cited by Vishay, the most telling case is Burtner v. Burnham, 13 Mass.
App. Ct. 158, 430 N.E.2d 1233 (1982), in which the Massachusetts appellate court followed Mur-
phy's interpretation of the Massachusetts long-arm statute. Buriner concerned a misrepresenta-
tion, perpetrated by mail and telephone, of the acreage in a land sale. Plaintiffs relied on the
misrepresentation. The appellate court found that jurisdiction existed "particularly in the light of
Federal cases in the First Circuit," then outlined the cases both following and rejecting the Mur-
phy cases. Buriner, 430 N.E.2d at 1236-37. The Oregon Supreme Court also has cited the Murphy
with approval. See State ex rel Academy Press, Ltd. v. Beckett, 282 Or. 701, 581 P.2d 496
(1978); BRS, Inc. v. Dickerson, 278 Or. 269, 563 P.2d 723 (1977); State ex reZ Advanced Dictating
Supply v. Dale, 269 Or. 242, 524 P.2d 1404 (1974).
18. Vishay, 696 F.2d at 1067. In Simon v. United States, 644 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1981), the
alleged tortious injury was based upon defendant's wrongful acts in influencing an Atlanta trial
judge to issue a bench warrant for plaintiff's arrest. The subpoena was served on plaintiff by
federal marshals in Louisiana. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that
"the service in Louisiana of the subpoena ticket, improperly issued at the direction of Neal, was a
cause-in-fact, or substantial factor, in the tort by Neal alleged as a cause of action in Simon's
complaint," and thus was within the Louisiana long-arm statute. Id. at 499. See LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13:3201(c) (West 1968) ("causing injury or damage by an offense or quasi offense commit-
ted through an act or omission in this state"). In Hamilton, Miller, Hudson & Fayne Travel Corp.
v. Hori, 520 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Mich. 1981), the court held that service of an Illinois summons and
complaint in Michigan constituted a tortious act under the Michigan long-arm statute. See MICH.
STAT. ANN. § 27A.705(2) (Callaghan 1976) ("the doing or causing an act to be done, or conse-
quences to occur, in the state resulting in an action for tort"). Since both statutes contain an
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deduced the following general rule from these opinions: "[I]f an out-of-state
defendant causes process to be served upon an in-state plaintiff, and the plain-
tiff subsequently sues the defendant in plaintiff's state, the state wherein the
alleged abusive process was served, on a cause of action arising out of such
abusive service of process," then personal jurisdiction exists over the defend-
ant.19 The court applied this rule and concluded that the service of process on
Vishay in North Carolina subjected Delta to North Carolina jurisdiction for
purposes of Vishay's claim of abusive service.
North Carolina General Statutes section 1-75.4(4)20 provides that state
courts may exercise jurisdiction over a local injury arising out of a defendant's
act occurring outside the state if certain business activities are being carried on
by the defendant within the state.2 ' In determining whether Delta's conduct
satisfied the section 1-75.4(4)(a) solicitation requirement, the court relied on
two federal district court cases interpreting that section.22 The court held that
express causation standard in the statutory language, a finding that abusive service of process falls
within the statutes is easier than in the case of the North Carolina "tortious conduct in this State"
requirement. To exercise personal jurisdiction in North Carolina, a court must employ Murphy-
type fictions to conclude that an out-of-state act was within the state for jurisdictional purposes.
19. Vishay, 696 F.2d at 1067.
20. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4(4) (1983) provides that jurisdiction may be asserted in the fol-
lowing circumstances:
(4) Local Injury; Foreign Act.-In any action for wrongful death occuring within this
State or in any action claiming injury to person or property within this State arising out
of an act or omission outside this State by the defendant, provided in addition that at or
about the time of the injury either:
a. Solicitations or services activities were carried on within this State by or on behalf of
the defendant; or
b. Products, materials or things processed, serviced or manufactured by the defendant
were used or consumed, within this State in the ordinary course of trade.
By separating the foreign act/local injury grounds from the "wholly local" tort grounds, the
legislature intended to avoid two problems encountered by other state statutes. 1 A. MCINTOSH,
supra note 11, § 937.10 at 166 n.53. The first problem the statute was designed to avoid was
having to decide whether "tortious acts" applies only to wholly local torts. Id. The second prob-
lem has been described as follows:
The second is the constitutional problem, which to some courts has seemed formidable
when jurisdiction is asserted on the basis of a single tortious activity occurring in sub-
stantial part outside the forum state .... The North Carolina statutory assertion is not
this liberal in favor of plaintiffs and specifically requires an amount of contemporaneous
bolstering activities which some courts have thought constitutionally required to support
jurisdiction in the foreign act-local consequences cases. The degree of bolstering activi-
ties required will of course have to be decided on a case by case basis.
.d.
21. Vishay's claims of injury suffered in North Carolina were sufficient for jurisdictional pur-
poses because a plaintiff need not prove injury under section 1-75.4(4)(a). Vishay, 696 F.2d at
1067-68.
22. Id. at 1068. The first case on which Vishay relied, Munchak Corp. v. Riko Enters., 368 F.
Supp. 1366 (M.D.N.C. 1973), held that the scouting of basketball players in North Carolina satis-
fied the "solicitation" requirement of § 1-75.4(4)(a), but did not satisfy the minimum contacts
requirement of the due process standard. Noting that § 1-75.4 was intended to be construed liber-
ally, the court stated:
Accordingly, there is no need to engage in a laborious analysis of the meanings of
key terms in the two alternative requirements in the provisos set forth in § 1-75.4(4). To
strictly construe the terms as set forth in those subsections so as to defeat in personam
jurisdiction when such jurisdiction would be constitutionally permissible would conflict
with the legislative and judicial mandate. Rather, it is concluded that the activities of the
defendant, which include preliminary contacts with North Carolina basketball players
[Vol. 621124
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"Delta's written communications, especially the mailing of the purchase order,
and telephone conversations with Vishay satisflied] the solicitation require-
ment."23 Thus, the court concluded that Delta's conduct fell within two provi-
sions of the North Carolina long-arm statutes.
Having satisfied the first prong of the jurisdictional inquiry, the court of
appeals turned to the due process prong.24 The court quoted the applicable
standard established in International Shoe Co. v. Washington:25
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the
forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the main-
tenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice." 26
The court, however, refused to apply the quantitative analysis suggested by
Delta, and instead focused on Delta's initiation of contacts with Vishay. The
court concluded that, by initiating contact with Vishay Delta intended to avail
itself of the benefits and protections of North Carolina laws.27 Once again, the
court of appeals relied on Murphy, in which the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit stated that:
[T]he element of intent also persuades us that there can be no consti-
tutional objection to Massachusetts asserting jurisdiction over the
out-of-state sender of a fraudulent misrepresentation, for such a
sender has thereby "purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking the bene-
fits and protections of its laws."'28
The intentional character of Delta's contact with Vishay also met the foresee-
with some expectation of future contract negotiations, and the knowing participation in
athletic contests, at least some of which will be shown on television throughout the
United States, including North Carolina, can reasonably be included within the solicita-
tion and marketing activities embodied in the subject statutory provisions.
Id. at 1371-72.
In contrast, "Delta's contacts were more contractual in their intent than were the 'preliminary
contacts' considered in Munchak." Vishay, 696 F.2d at 1068 (quoting Munchak, 368 F. Supp. at
1372). For an analysis of the Munchak decision, see Note, Munchak Corp. v. Riko: Putting a
Little Polish on International Shoe, 52 N.C.L. REv. 809, 850 (1974).
The second case relied on by Vishay, Federal Ins. Co. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 341 F. Supp.
855 (W.D.N.C. 1972), a,'dmem., 473 F.2d 909 (4th Cir. 1973), concluded that magazine adver-
tisements were solicitations "by or on behalf of' the manufacturer under § 1-75.4(4). Id. at 856.
These advertisements, however, were in conjunction with a state-wide network of distributorships
and service centers. "The cumulative result of Piper's activity is an established program in North
Carolina of solicitation of customers, sales of Piper aircraft, and the provision of a network of
authorized service facilities for local Piper owners." Id.
23. Vishay, 696 F.2d at 1068.
24. See supra notes 9, 12 and accompanying text.
25. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
26. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
27. Vishay, 696 F.2d at 1068. "[I]t is essential in each case that there be some act by which
the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws." Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,
253 (1958).
28. Murphy, 460 F.2d 661, 664 (1st Cir. 1972) (quoting Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253
(1958)).
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ability test enunciated in World- Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson .29 Delta
could reasonably have expected to be haled into court in North Carolina to
answer Vishay's claims arising out of the contacts initiated by Delta.
Among other factors relevant to the due process determination, the court
noted that Vishay's cause of action arose out of Delta's contacts with North
Carolina.30 This fact distinguished several cases cited by Delta.31 The court
also noted several state interests in determining whether the minimum con-
tacts requirement had been satisfied. 32 Finally, the court weighed the relative
conveniences to the parties, concluding that the inconvenience to Delta in de-
fending suit in North Carolina did not deny it due process. 33
The Vishay decision represents a logical approach to modem commercial
transactions that is consistent with the policy expressed in the North Carolina
long-arm statutes.34 When telephone calls and written communications form
an integral part of a tort claim, those communications may be said to be "tor-
29. 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) ("[T]he foreseeability that is critical to due process. . . is that
the defendant's conduct and connection with the forum State are such that he should reasonably
anticipate being haled into court there.").
30. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). "[I]t has been generally
recognized that the casual presence of the corporate agent or even his conduct of single, or isolated
items of activities in a state in the corporation's behalf are not enough to subject it to suit on
causes of action unconnected with the activities there." Id. at 317.
31. See, e.g., Munchak Corp. v. Riko Enters., 368 F.Supp. 1366 (M.D.N.C. 1973) (Defend-
ant's contacts were insufficient to meet due process standards for personal jurisdiction,). In
Munchak "[a]n important factor in the court's decision was the fact that the alleged contacts with
North Carolina were unrelated to the claim for relief asserted." Note, supra note 22, at 856.
32. The interests of North Carolina that the court listed were: (1) plaintiff was a North Caro-
lina resident; (2) plaintiff sought relief under the North Carolina unfair trade practices statute; (3)
the cause of action centered on the production of $130,000 worth of goods that would have been
manufactured in North Carolina; and (4) the Delta contacts with North Carolina were essential
elements of Vishay's claims. Vishay, 696 F.2d at 1069. By including the state's interest in the
litigation in its determination whether the minimum contacts requirement was met, the court erro-
neously caused a "subtle shift in focus from the defendant to the plaintiff." Rush v. Savchuk, 444
U.S. 320, 332 (1980). In Rush the Supreme Court cautioned against this shift in focus by stating:
Such an approach is forbidden by International Shoe and its progeny. Ifa defendent has
certain judicially cognizable ties with a State, a variety of factors relating to the particu-
lar cause of action may be relevent to the determination whether the exercise ofjurisdic-
tion would comport with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
Id. at 332 (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). "In other
words, these other factors may confirm or defeat jurisdiction, but they may not create it." Louis,
supra note I, at 421. Thus, the Virhay court should have stated that the interest of North Carolina
is a relevent factor in determining whether the exercise of jurisdiction is fair, only after determin-
ing that sufficient contacts were present.
33. "While the defendant's witnesses are located in California, since Delta initiated the con-
tested series of events, its inconvenience in transporting those witnesses to North Carolina when
weighed against the inconvenience that would result to Vishay if it had to file suit in California"
does not deny due process. Vishay, 696 F.2d at 1069.
34. For a discussion of the legislative intent behind N.C. GEN STAT. § 1-75.4 (1983) and Id.
§ 55-145 (1982), see supra notes 11-12.
Prior to Vishay, the federal courts construed North Carolina's long-arm statutes more nar-
rowly than the North Carolina Supreme Court. It was noted that "the North Carolina Supreme
Court is more ready to grant jurisdiction to protect North Carolina residents, quite naturally, and
• ..it has taken the supposedly liberal interpretation offered by International Shoe more to heart
than have federal courts." Note, supra note 11, at 457-58. Vishay brought the federal court's
approach to § 55-145 into line with the State court's view.
1126 [Vol. 62
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tious conduct" within the state and may satisfy the minimum contacts test.35
Similarly, characterizing a purchase order and other communications as "so-
licitation activities" is appropriate given the policy underlying section 1-75.4.
Although no North Carolina appellate court has adopted such a broad inter-
pretation of the solicitation requirement, language in several cases supports
this construction.3 6
In finding Delta's conduct to be within the reach of the North Carolina
long-arm statutes and sufficient to satisfy due process requirements, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit adequately protected unwilling
defendants from the burdens of litigating in a distant forum. The Vishay ap-
proach permits courts to assert jurisdiction only in cases in which the commu-
nications in issue form an essential part of the plaintiff's tort claim. The
Vishay holding, however, does not permit a court to exercise jurisdiction if
communications unrelated to the tort claim were transmitted to North Caro-
lina because the due process requirements of foreseeability and purposeful
conduct would not be satisfied.
Thus, the Vishay court recognized the realities of modem commercial
practice. Routine interstate solicitations and purchase orders may provide in-
sufficient contacts to justify one state's assertion of personal jursidiction over
an out-of-state defendant in a typical breach-of-contract suit. Fraudulent or
misrepresentative communications, however, are not routine commercial prac-
tices. The Vishay decision recognized that when fraudulent or misrepresenta-
tive communications form the basis of a plaintiff's claim, they also may justify
a court's assertion of personal jurisdiction. Denying jurisdiction in such cir-
cumstances would allow defendants to act irresponsibly with relative impu-
nity, knowing that they would not be held accountable for their actions in the
forum state.
The Vishay court's expansive reading of the provisions of the North Caro-
lina long-arm statute represents a thoughtfully reasoned analysis, and should
35. These communications are to be distinguished from situations in which the cause of ac-
tion sounds in contract, not tort. In such situations, the same telephone calls may not constitute
"tortious conduct" in the State, and may not fall within that provision of the long-arm statute.
36. The following cases emphasized, among other factors, defendant's solicitations in North
Carolina in finding due process contacts sufficient: Dillon v. Numismatic Funding Corp., 291 N.C.
674, 231 S.E.2d 629 (1977) (defendant actively solicited orders for its coins from North Carolina
residents through several mass mailings to North Carolinians); Farmer v. Ferris, 260 N.C. 619,
133 S.E.2d 492 (1963) (foreign corporation sent list of available rides through mails to operators of
amusement parks in North Carolina, thereby soliciting orders); Mabry v. Fuller-Shuwayer Co., 50
N.C. App. 245, 251, 273 S.E.2d 509, 513 (1981) (solicitation of employment through advertisement
in a newspaper of wide circulation in North Carolina, long distance telephone conversations by
defendant's agent with an undetermined number of residents, and approximately 28 mailed letters
containing "conditional offers of employment" that North Carolina residents received at their
homes), disc. rev. denied, 302 N.C. 398, 279 S.E.2d 352 (1981); Delprinting Corp. v. C.P.D. Corp.,
49 N.C. App. 449, 271 S.E.2d 548 (1980) (written memoranda on Illinois corporation's stationery
requested plaintiff corporation to ship books to churches in five states); Parris v. Garner Commer-
cial Disposal, Inc., 40 N.C. App. 282, 253 S.E.2d 29 (insurer had sent letter to plaintiff's counsel,
and policy was mailed in an envelope bearing insurer's trademark), disc. rev. denied, 297 N.C. 455,
256 S.E.2d 808 (1979). Two federal district court cases have construed § 1-75.4(4) broadly.
Munchak Corp. v. Riko Enters., 368 F. Supp. 1366 (M.D.N.C. 1973); Federal Ins. Co. v. Piper
Aircraft Corp., 341 F. Supp. 855 (W.D.N.C. 1972), a f'dmem., 473 F.2d 909 (4th Cir. 1973). Both
cases are discussed supra note 
22.
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give adequate guidance to other courts in applying the provisions to particular
activities of corporations. The North Carolina courts should adopt the Vishay
holding because its interpretation of the North Carolina long-arm provisions
implements the express legislative policy of protecting the interests of North
Carolina residents.
ELIZABETH ANN UPCHURCH
